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Dr. Morton Prince.





ROOSEVELT AS  
ANALYZED BY THE  
NEW PSYCHOLOGY

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**T**HIS Roosevelt's personality, that his actions, his opinions, his attitudes toward political situations, and, above all, the motives which have actuated him to take any particular position on given questions, are difficult to interpret, is manifest from the great diversity of opinion which is called forth when any attempt is made to explain them.

One has only to listen to the divergent views expressed among any group of thinking people, or to read the various opinions expressed in current editorials to see how far apart are the views commonly held, and how difficult it is to construe his actions and to fathom his intentions. Nothing has shown this more conspicuously than the mystification of the public regarding Roosevelt's course since his return from Africa, and his recent and present attitude toward his candidature for the Presidential nomination.

Various psychological analyses of his character have appeared in the newspapers, but all have been of a superficial sort, and have left the explanation of his personality as unsatisfactory as it was before. And yet, if he be studied in the light of what is now known as the "new psychology" everything, I think, becomes simplified, and the motives actuating every important mental behavior which he has exhibited become revealed in clear light. Indeed Roosevelt might quite as well be introduced into a textbook of the new psychology to illustrate its principles as its principles used to explain Roosevelt.

It is not easy in a short article in popular language without the use of technical terms to make this psychology intelligible to the layman, but I should like to make the trial.

The first principle that needs to be grasped is that when we put something, that we do not wish to think about out of our minds, the real thing that we do is to put it into our minds; that is, it becomes subconscious.

This is not a figure of speech. A thought that in this way becomes subconscious is a definite thing, and just as much a part of our personality as if it were in our consciousness. It can subconsciously function without our being aware of the fact and thus unconsciously determine what our conscious thoughts shall be.

This is the explanation of the well-known fact that, as often happens with many of us, we find the answer to some problem, upon which we were recently unsuccessfully engaged, suddenly to our astonishment pop into consciousness. Not having been able to find the solution we gave up the problem for the time being and put it out of mind. What really happened was that we put the problem into the subconscious where it was carried on; the subconsciousness finally gave the answer to consciousness.

The next principle is that we are constantly putting into the subconsciousness wishes which, being shocking to our moral natures, we are unwilling to entertain, to admit to ourselves. We repress them, put them out of our minds, that is, into the subconsciousness, where they percolate and express themselves in certain ways—for instance, in dreams.

Finally, when an unacceptable wish is accompanied by strong feeling and is repressed into the subconscious, the driving force of the feeling tends to bring the thought to the surface, give it expression, and to accomplish its end. But it finds difficulty in doing this owing to the fact that it meets with resistance from the repressing force of our consciousness which will not tolerate it. There results a conflict and the subconscious wish can only come to expression in some disguised or veiled form—so veiled that we shall not consciously recognize it.

In other words, there is a sort of compromise, and the subconscious wish is allowed expression only on condition that we shall not be consciously aware of its true meaning. This is what is really meant when in popular language we say



Mr. Roosevelt and the Kaiser Have a Talk.



of a person he is unconsciously governed by this or that motive; he unconsciously wishes this or that; "the wish is father to the thought," &c.

Such in a sketchy form are the psychological principles which the new psychology finds at work in all of us as fundamental mechanisms of human nature. After all it is only formulating a rather precise mental mechanism for what has long been known in a general way to be true.


Now, can some of the puzzling conduct of Mr. Roosevelt since his return from Africa be made intelligible through these principles? Let us see. Roosevelt goes out of office with a slight revulsion of feeling—a feeling of resentment against Mr. Taft engendered by some petty personal irritation that occurred, according to reliable reports, during the last few days of office.

These irritants, which even at this early period threatened to disturb their friendly relations, were Mr. Taft's refusal to appoint to his Cabinet certain of Mr. Roosevelt's followers—his (Mr. Taft's) thought-

lessness in coming to Washington to be inaugurated a little ahead of time—(the limelight was focussed upon the new king before the old king was dead: what king could stand that?) and Mr. Taft's tactless letter of thanks and gratitude. In this letter the President gave his brother Charles equally with Roosevelt credit for making him President. The ex-President when he read that letter is credited with having snapped those teeth together with rage.

Such things hurt; we may say we don't care, but we do, and we may put them out of our minds, but that means we really put them into our minds. If a psychologist had tapped the subconsciousness of the ex-President he might have found there that resentment lying fallow for the time being, but ready to express itself under favoring conditions. Roosevelt undoubtedly was all unconscious of his subconscious feeling, but, we can safely say, it was there all the same. If nothing else had happened this subconscious resentment would probably have worked itself off in some harmless way.





But there was another factor which was of still greater importance in building up a subconscious motive force. Roosevelt leaves the White House liking his "job." Everybody even at this late day remembers this. "I like my job," he declaimed with some feeling again and again. There was no pretense of being tired of care and responsibility; no pretense of a desire to return to private life. He let the public know that he liked the job of being President. And so he went away with a lurking liking to be President again. In nearly every country of Europe he was the recipient of (not surfeited with) attention as a private citizen, such as is ordinarily only bestowed upon the heads of Government. All this served to remind him of the job he liked and had lost, and what might be if he were President again.

This attitude of mind could mean only one thing—a wish that was intolerable, one that, as a matter of honor, could not be entertained, so he put it out of his mind and it went into the subconscious.

There were two reasons why such a wish could not be morally acceptable to him as an honorable man. First, he had given a solemn promise to the people that under "no circumstances" would he accept another term, and, second, it would be disloyal to his friend, the President, for another four years to come. So he refused to himself to entertain such an idea.

Now, mark what follows. He returns to this country and is received by the adulations of the people: when this is over the public awaits with keen anticipation the meeting of the two most conspicuous personages in the country—the President and the man who had made him: two loyal and steadfast friends.

The people remembered the dramatic scene immediately following the inauguration ceremonies, when these two men threw their arms around each other's shoulders, each wishing the other god-speed. The people, now almost on the tip-toe of excitement, were looking for another dramatic meeting of these two friends.

Naturally, the country expected that the first thing Roosevelt would do would be to seek the President, and it was natural under the circumstances that he should do it. There were other reasons why he should go to him. The President, his friend, was in trouble. An immense amount of criticism had been directed at him by the insurgents, progressives, tariff reformers, and malcontents. Pinchot had just been dismissed from office and was stirring up trouble. Mr. Taft was trying to unite a divided party and to

pour oil upon the troubled waters. For these reasons alone, therefore, the first impulse of any right-minded man would be to go at once to his friend and successor, advise, confer with him if desired, help him in guiding the party.

Now what does he do? To the amazement of the country he studiously keeps away, and, with the exception of three rather forced interviews, has kept away from the President ever since.


What was the motive force which successfully resisted a natural impulse common to every man? Undoubtedly Roosevelt can give one or more plausible reasons satisfactory to himself and convincing to the layman for his behavior; the average admirer of Roosevelt can undoubtedly give reasons equally satisfactory to himself; but it is exceedingly doubtful if Roosevelt himself knew the real reason. Such is the teaching of modern psychology. We must examine the situation to appreciate the full force of the mental conflict going on in himself consciously or subconsciously.

Here was a man who by birth, education, and social environment we have a right to believe from a psychological point of view was a high-bred gentleman, a man of honor and integrity. By the force of family and class traditions, by the influence of university and social training and example, the traits of honor and loyalty to his friends had been inculcated deeply in his personality.

It was no ordinary thing then in a man of this type to suppress the impulses of these traits and to act contrary to them. What was it then that suppressed them. In such a man the fact was extraordinary and needs explanation.

To find the answer we must go back a little. We have seen that Mr. Roosevelt left the White House with the liking or repressed inadmissible (to himself) wish to be President again. It is common knowledge that while in Africa and Europe he received hundreds of letters from his insurgent friends inciting him to insurgency and belittling the President—his friend.

Pinchot, also his friend, dismissed from office, unable to await his return, rushes to Italy to meet him and to pour into his ear heaven knows what temptations. The wish, weak at first, a passing thought, springs to life again and regains new and intense motive force. Still it is intolerable to his nature and is repressed again and again, and driven into the subconscious. Mr. Roosevelt returns to this country, and is straightway on arrival met by insurgent friends, to whom he listens and with whom he soon confers. He hears a great deal about the "wrongs of the





"Returns and Is Received by the  
Adulations of the People."



people," the "betrayal of my policies," the control of "bad men," and so on. The subconscious wish which has acquired intense feeling tone under the excitement of all that is poured into his ear (how he could right everything if he were President!) now finds its opportunity.

There is a sub-conscious conflict between the repressing moral conscience and the wish. The former is the stronger; so the latter still cannot pass the moral censor and be consciously accepted and avowed; it can only pass into consciousness and determine his conduct in a disguised form. This it does; it makes him believe, without knowing his real reason for his belief, that the grievances of the insurgents are the grievances of the people; that his friend "Bill" was, after all, a mistake, and determines him to keep away from the President. Why? If he goes to the President he is 'lost'! If once more he puts his arms around Mr. Taft, if he advises him, becomes more or less responsible for his actions, he cannot as a man of honor oppose him and consort with his enemies, and he cannot be again a candidate in 1912 for the Presidency. His wish cannot be fulfilled, and he is lost. So his sub-conscious wish takes ad-

vantage of the situation, converts itself into specious reasons which appear in consciousness and keep him distant from the President.

I would not for one moment have it assumed that at this early date Mr. Roosevelt was aware of the true reason for his extraordinary conduct. He will deny it with all the vehemence of his vehement nature. He will give emphatic and what appear to himself and to others who wish to think as he does, high moral reasons which he thinks guided him. To this I answer, he is mistaken; he, like all others, but above all others, does not know himself; he has never yet faced himself, and any one who would know himself must face himself.

"A halo round your head you'll prate of virtue  
But shrink to face yourself as strong men do;  
You'll cut a swath of sorrow round about you  
And think, 'To blame are they alone,' not you."

It is not, I think, without interest to state, as showing that this analysis is not based upon our present knowledge of subsequent events, that at an early period, shortly after his return from Europe, when Mr. Roosevelt kept at a distance from Mr. Taft, and before anything







had transpired that showed his present intentions, the writer made the diagnosis, on psychological grounds alone, that the real factor that determined his behavior was the sub-conscious wish, as above outlined, and predicted that eventually he would be a candidate. Witnesses have recently reminded me of this diagnosis and prophecy.

In this connection there is another incident that is of psychological importance, though its psychological meaning has entirely escaped notice of lay critics.

It is a psychological principle that when a person shows very intense feeling in regard to some object, person, or idea, of all proportion to the relative importance of that idea, it is not due, as would superficially appear to be the case, to the idea in consciousness, but to some other idea associated with it, but repressed into the subconscious.

For instance, a person might show an intense dislike for such a simple thing as a carnation (flower), so much so as to excite even anger when asked to wear one in his coat. Such intense feeling is only correctly explained, no matter what logical excuses may be given for it, when the sub-consciousness is explored and all associated ideas brought to the full light of day. Then it is found that a rival for a woman's affection has the habit of wearing a carnation in his coat; that there is intense jealousy of this rival; that an exciting episode of a psychologically painful character once occurred; that the memory of this episode was repressed because of the unpleasant recollection, &c. It then appears that the emotions of these repressed memories determined unconsciously the person's intense dislike for carnations. With this principle in mind let us return to Mr. Roosevelt.

On June 27, 1911, Mr. Roosevelt wrote to Mr. Van Valkenburg, editor of The Philadelphia North American, denying with great heat the story given out by the Associated Press that he (Roosevelt) had given assurance that he would support Mr. Taft, and vehemently asserting "that the story was not a misunderstanding; was not based upon any information, but was a deliberate invention made out of the whole cloth, without one particle of basis beyond the imagination of the man who made it."

Now, why so much heat—why so much feeling over so small a matter as a story that Mr. Roosevelt would support Mr. Taft? Mr. Roosevelt was Mr. Taft's friend; he had made him President. Mr. Roosevelt had declared over and over again (and in the same breath) that he would not be a candidate—and urged his friends not to help a movement for his candidacy. There should have been nothing,

therefore, in his conscious thought (if he really did not want to be a candidate) that should have caused so much emotion at the mere thought of supporting Mr. Taft. So intense feeling, interpreted in the light of the new psychology, can only mean that the emotion belonging to the subconscious wish had become converted into conscious anger and had worked itself off and exhausted itself in that disguised form. Mr. Roosevelt undoubtedly thought and still thinks his anger was due to the public misrepresentation of his position (harmless in itself if he really wished what he believed he wished); actually the anger was induced by a subconscious process.


I have no doubt Mr. Roosevelt will probably resent this interpretation and attribute it to all sorts of malignant motives on the writer's part. If so, it will be psychologically interesting because the greater his resentment the greater the probability of the truth of the analysis. So it is always.

I have only spoken of the emotion displayed in this incident. His conduct in disclaiming all intention to support Mr. Taft shows that, as late as June 27, his subconsciousness was still determining his attitude in a direction that would eventually leave it possible for him to become President again. Surely if he supported Mr. Taft he again would be lost. So the impulse of the wish, striving for fulfillment, determines him to withhold his sympathy and support and to encourage the progressive movement which tended to undermine the administration. It was not difficult, of course, for his subconscious wish to present many plausible, moral reasons to his consciousness. Recent psychological investigations have shown very clearly the reality and mechanism of this phenomenon.

Confirmation of this analysis is found in the fact that recently (statement of March 5) Mr. Roosevelt confesses that at the date of the Van Valkenburg letter he was ready to accept the nomination if offered to him. Of course then he would not support Mr. Taft.

Many a person has felt aggrieved and denied motives alleged to have actuated himself and has challenged the psychologist to the test. But when submitted to the test the psychologist has proved right and the challenger has been obliged to admit, when his sub-consciousness has been revealed and brought to the full light of day, that he had deceived himself and that the real motives, hidden as they were were far from being those which he had naively supposed. And if Mr. Roosevelt denies the truth of this analysis of his personality I in turn chal-





...ence him to the test. Let him submit himself to what is technically called a "psycho-analysis."

It is interesting to observe the power of the motive force of a subconscious wish involving a strong feeling and the modes by which it works itself out to fulfillment. Lack of space prevents my referring to more than two or three in-

stances.

Besides keeping away from Mr. Taft, his friend—a friendship deliciously satirized by Mr. Dooley—it is notorious that Mr. Roosevelt's conduct during the New York campaign and since, was calculated, whatever his conscious intention, to undermine Mr. Taft's Administration. I pass over his disparaging, contemptuous remarks to personal friends in private conversation, remarks which were afterward repeated so widely and with such uniformity of style that his opinion became public property. Not being susceptible of proof I pass these over. His public actions and statements alone attested and were sufficient, as everyone has felt, to impair Mr. Taft's popularity and prestige. This is generally admitted as a political fact. This line of conduct, similar to keeping his distance, was equally extraordinary and needs equal explanation. It was equally opposed to the natural impulses of a normal, high-minded man in whom had been inculcated the traits and impulses of loyalty and honor. Let us not forget that what is extraordinary in one man is not extraordinary in another. I am assuming, and I have the right to assume, psychologically speaking, that Mr. Roosevelt had all these traits and, therefore, necessarily had their impulses. An action that is contrary to them accordingly needs explanation. What impulse opposed these other impulses?

Here is where the opposing impulses of the subconscious wish got in its work. Unable to express itself openly, even while he was consciously avowing, and honestly believing as he supposed, his determination not to contest the nomination in 1912, the subconscious was determining his judgments and directing his conduct so that the conditions that would render his nomination possible would be brought about and the wish be fulfilled.

Take another factor in the mental situation of Col. Roosevelt's mind. Twice while President he had solemnly promised the American people that he would not take a third term. This often quoted promise of Nov. 8, 1904, ran as follows: "The wise custom which limits the President to two terms regards the substance and not the form, and under no circumstances will I be a candidate for or accept another nomination." In view of this statement his subsequent re-election and interpretation of his promise has much more psychological interest than has been attributed to it. Let us study the events. As far back as June 27 last, as I will later point out, Col. Roosevelt was unquestionably honestly urging his

"friends to drop all talk of his possible candidacy and to use every effort to discourage such talk in their own circles." (statement of E. A. Van Valkenburg, March 5, 1912) and "to prevent any such movement." (letter of T. R. to A. P. Moore Aug. 18, 1911:) this was his conscious attitude. And yet, what now will appear paradoxical to some at this very time, according to Col. Roosevelt's own dictated statement (March 5, 1912) and his letter to Frank A. Munsey (Jan. 16, 1912) he was ready to accept the nomination if offered to him; that is to say, to recant, reinterpret, or misread—put it in any language you choose—his promise of 1904. "To all who then asked," says Col. Roosevelt, "whether I would accept if nominated, I answered 'Yes, if I knew them sufficiently well to be sure that they would understand me.'" How could he interpret such a plain statement as he made to the people as meaning two consecutive terms? And particularly when a nomination for a third term was refused to Grant after an interval of four years? We have seen that the resistance to his repressed subconscious wish had prevented him up to this time from openly avowing his candidacy. Did this wish, nevertheless, have just sufficient opposing force to evade the censor, and, sneaking by in disguise, unconsciously determine his interpretation of his promise? Let us see.

It is a principle of the "new psychology" that many slips of memory, of the tongue and pen, mistakes of spelling, the misreading and interpretation of words, &c., are not due to chance, but are determined by subconscious processes of the mind. A repressed intolerable thought or wish really drags the memory of a desired word, or the correct word, &c., as the case may be, out of consciousness and substitutes another word, or spelling, for that which was intended, and another meaning for the true meaning of a written or spoken sentence. It all seems accidental, but psycho-analysis shows a true cause and effect. In the space at my disposal I cannot, of course, enter into this psychological phenomenon more extensively, but let us apply it as it stands. One might possibly, if given to specious reasoning, or if under a strong conscious desire, interpret as Col. Roosevelt now does the latter half of the statement, ("under no circumstances will I be a candidate for or accept another nomination.") as meaning only in 1908—or as The Outlook phrased it, "I will have no more coffee this morning." Let us give such a person the benefit of the doubt. But Col. Roosevelt entirely overlooked, failed to remember, or to take in the meaning of the first part of his promise—a matter psychologically of great significance. "The wise custom which limits the President to two terms," he said. "What is a 'custom'?" He did not say "promise" or "principles," he said "custom." According to the Century Dictionary custom means: "A common use or practice, either of an individual or of a community, but especially





A Presidential Vacation by Paul

of the latter; habitual repetition of the same act or procedure. Established manner or way. 2. In law, Ancient and general usage having the force of law. Now, what has been the common practice inaugurated by Washington, confirmed as a political principle by Jefferson, and held to by McKinley, and followed ever since the Republic was founded? There can be no difference of opinion as to this. It is not open to interpretation. We are dealing with an established fact. No President has been given more than two terms, whether consecutive or intermittent. So the "common practice," the "ancient and general usage" having the force of law has, as Col. Roosevelt said, limited the President to two terms, whether consecutive or intermittent.

Now, it is interesting to note that Col. Roosevelt entirely forgot or misread this part of his promise. Even as far back as last June, (statement of March 6, 1912,) in explaining his refusal to support Mr. Taft, he overlooked this part of his promise, failed to see it or remember it. Consequently he forgot or misread it. Such a misreading the Germans call a *verlesen*. How came a person with such an extraordinary memory as Col. Roosevelt to forget or misread such an important statement to the public? The psychological mechanism by which it is brought about may be understood from what I have already said. Subconsciously, or consciously, desiring a nomination, the memory of that promise is intolerable to him; such part of it, therefore, as is incompatible with the wish is repressed from consciousness and is forgotten, or overlooked if the written words are before him; the sub-conscious then holds the attention upon, i. e., presents to consciousness, so much of the promise as is compatible with an interpretation favorable to the wish, and, lo and behold! the trick is done—unconsciously.



Mr. Roosevelt Riding with the Wife of Italy.

Another example of this same principle is to be found in Col. Roosevelt's letter to Mr. Munsey, already referred to. In this case it is the reading into a fact a false meaning which is determined by an unavowed wish—a wish which has not been squarely faced by the possessor. In this letter, written last January, referring to the circumstances under which his promise was given in 1904, he speaks of the custom that had grown up not to elect a man as President for a third consecutive term. Now, plainly, as no custom so limited has ever existed, this is a reading into custom something that is not there, namely, a policy for which he is ready to stand. What was it that determined his mind to so read a meaning into the word "custom" as to falsify it? A psycho-analysis of his mental processes would have undoubtedly revealed a strong desire to have the actual custom broken so as to permit a third intermittent term for himself. With this strong unavowed desire in his mind he would naturally, on well-known psychological principles, think it a wise policy to permit such a third term and the unconscious reading of that meaning into the language of his promise would follow. Examples of his reading of a false meaning into a fact every one can recognize for himself in his own experience of every-day life.

I have spoken of the apparent paradox in Col. Roosevelt's attitude as early as last June. At this time, it will be remembered, he was discouraging his friends from undertaking any aggressive movement to secure his nomination, and, at the same time, according to his own statement, he had expressed himself over and over again to his friends that he would accept the nomination "if it were offered to him." These apparently conflicting attitudes of mind are easily intelligible on the principles I have been explaining. He was ready to "accept if nominated" because, having interpreted to





himself his promise of 1904 in accordance with his subconscious wish, the repressing force of his conscious censor had been largely withdrawn, and the subconscious wish came to the surface and was tolerated, and he permitted to himself that he desired the Presidency and would take it if offered to him. There were, however, certain conditions in his consciousness to his willingness, owing to the fact that all the most objections were not yet eliminated. He had got rid, as we have seen, of the main difficulty—the promise of 1904; there remained, however, another difficult—the disloyalty to Mr. Taft. This he knew would be resented by the public, if it were believed that he was definitely plotting and attempting to secure, on his own initiative, the Presidency for himself. If, however, the people themselves demanded his candidacy, it would be another matter. It was therefore necessary, in order that he might retain the respect of the people, and that the tragedy of his conduct might be overlooked, that the demand should come from the people, not from himself. Consequently, it was essential that he should prevent his friends from working up a movement that would appear to indicate that he was attempting to secure the coveted prize.

What evidence have we of this interpretation? A little later on, Aug. 18, 1911, he wrote to Mr. Moore, Publisher of The Pittsburgh Courier:

"I must ask not only you but every friend I have to see to it that no movement whatever is made to bring me forward for the nomination in 1912. I feel that I have a right to ask all my friends, if necessary, actively to work to prevent any such movement. I should esteem it a genuine calamity if such a movement were undertaken."

Why such a strong expression, "A genuine calamity"? And what calamity? Here we meet with another interesting psychological principle. We constantly find, on analysis, that feelings, attitudes of mind, ideas, &c., are due to the motivating force coming from more than one associated idea, and some of the latter may be subconscious. In the above sentence "calamity" might refer, and probably did refer, consciously or unconsciously, to two objects—the country and himself. So far as the country was concerned if such a movement were undertaken the "wise custom" established in the unwritten law by Washington and Jefferson might be broken. We have seen that consciously he had satisfactorily, to himself, interpreted this custom and his promise "under no circumstances to accept another term." But modern psychology and investigations have shown that our conscious knowledge is not our whole knowledge, but that our subconscious knowledge, the great storehouse of our past experiences, may be much wider, more accurate, more truthful. If we could have probed his subconscious processes we would undoubtedly have found that true memories of the custom, and of the intention of his promise, and the ideas of the calamity that would befall the country if the custom were broken. You can fool your conscious thoughts, but you cannot fool your subconsciousness. Subconsciously he still knew that his conscious interpretation of his promise was but a distortion of the truth and that this distortion was determined by the subconscious. Subconsciously he still knew that breaking the established custom would be a calamity.

More consciously, however, by "a genuine calamity," he undoubtedly referred to the calamity that would come upon him if he should be placed in a dishon-

orable position before the American people. At this date the censor of his consciousness still recognized that he was understood by the people to have given his solemn promise to resign upon retirement, and that he was expected, as a man of honor, to owe loyalty and allegiance to Mr. Taft. Until the people, therefore, were ready to condone this double duplicity by asking him to accept the nomination his hands were tied. His great political asset with the people was that he was believed to be honest. If this belief should be shattered he would be lost. Further, the thought of putting himself in a position where he would cease to be the idol of the people was intolerable to him. And so the wish to be an active candidate was repressed and driven into the subconscious.

This is the only explanation of the expression "calamity" and the feeling it implies compatible with the situation. Those who wish to make use of a man do not, of course, care how much they drag in the mud and dishonor their instrument. They, therefore, were willing to bring this "calamity" upon Col. Roosevelt, who had still sufficient conscious recognition of his situation to hold back his supposed friends.

So it appears that on Aug. 18, 1911, the wish, now conscious, was still not strong enough to induce him to make a fight for the nomination; the people were not ripe. Here, then, we see that from last June and on, and possibly before that date, the subconscious wish was beginning to be acceptable; in fact, had come to the surface and was admitted to himself. A distinct development had taken place in his mental processes—the subconscious and the conscious were coming together and blending. The wish, however, was tolerable only up to a certain point; it was not tolerable to openly fight for the nomination. This as yet was unacceptable to his censor, but, we shall see, was a later development and came to pass in the course of about six months.

At what date the subconscious wish to be an active candidate became acceptable to his consciousness, and the censor could allow him to carry it to fulfillment, it is not easy to say without an opportunity to subject Col. Roosevelt to a psychological analysis and probe his mind. During the Fall and Winter he was in close communion with his insurgent friends, the so-called Progressive policies were acquiring force and emotional strength in his mind. They were fast becoming sentiments. The subconscious wish in the new form was unconsciously determining his thoughts to encourage these policies and specifically to encourage La Follette, who had announced his candidacy for the fight. And this notwithstanding that he had written and, as he has confessed, had said to "Gifford Pinchot, Jim Garfield, and Congressman Madison, and Billy Lock, and Secretary Mr. and Secretary Stimson, all alike," that he had no intention of asking any part in the nomination for or against any one to make. Here we see the unacceptable wish to be an active candidate unconsciously determining his conduct. He was taking part, though not openly, but secretly, as part of what we in shorthand may write as against Mr. Taft. He was giving aid and comfort to the enemy. Meanwhile, as is common knowledge, Col. Roosevelt's friends, headed by the restraining Plattsburgh Intrigue, were bringing about a situation in which the nomination of Col. Roosevelt would be possible in place of La Follette. It would be easy to select numerous facts indicative of this purpose.





They were also working to make it appear to Col. Roosevelt that there was a "call from the people" for him to take the nomination—a call which it was his duty to yield to. If this could be made clear it would be open to him to declare his candidacy.

Finally, in December, came what was practically the public announcement of his candidacy. He announced simply that he was "not a candidate," but refused to say anything further in explanation. This was an old, time-worn, stereotyped, hackneyed expression which has been made to do duty by many a politician who in a similar situation has desired a nomination. In Mr. Roosevelt's case this phrase was still more pregnant with meaning. Mr. Roosevelt refused to go further and take the public into his confidence, he refused to follow Washington and Jefferson in a patriotic statement to his fellow-citizens and say again that a "wise custom" forbade his "accepting" a nomination. (What a magnificent opportunity to endear himself in the hearts of the people as a patriot!) His refusal had only one meaning, that which we now know positively from his own statement of what his position was at this time, namely, he was willing to accept if the nomination were offered to him. Indeed, it is well known that about this time he had said to numerous friends in private conversation that he would not go further and put himself in such a position that he would so tie his hands that he could not accept the nomination if it were offered to him. The writer himself heard this from the lips of a mutual friend within a few hours after Mr. Roosevelt had said it to an assembled group of guests. And all at a time when the public at large, including a large number of his well wishers, and probably Mr. Taft himself, took his words at their face value and believed that under no circumstances would he accept another nomination.

Since the above paragraph was written Mr. Roosevelt has given out the letter (above referred to) written by him Jan. 16, 1912, to Frank A. Munsey, the publisher. In this letter he states at considerable length that he would not "tie his hands by a statement," for the same reasons that he was reprieved to have given to his friends, and repeats that he would accept if the people wished him to do so. He further states that he had again and again made the same statement "to friends, and even foes," mentioning a number of names. To say that he was not a candidate simply meant, then, in his mind, that he would not fight for the nomination, but would accept if it were offered him. Here we see a distinct progression in his mental process since last June. He was willing to go beyond privately expressed statements and so on public record, though in veiled political language, as saying "Hark! is willm!" The apple of public approval was judged to be ripening.

To appreciate the force of the hackneyed political expression "I am not a candidate," it is enough to remember that even now Mr. Roosevelt is only on public record as saying that he will accept the nomination "if it should be offered to me." But when an active organization, with National headquarters and headquarters in nearly every State, is working hard for his nomination, it means that he is an active candidate. The phrase is pure euphemism.

An example of the curious but psychologically intelligible contradictions to which

the human mind is subject is brought out in a statement issued by Mr. Roosevelt on March 6, some time after he had announced his willingness to accept the nomination if offered to him. In the statement he still says he will accept only if the people in open primaries declare that they wish him to do so, and his manager, Senator Dixon, on the same date calls "attention again to the fact that Col. Roosevelt has declared that he is not an active candidate for the nomination, but will accept it if it comes to him as the demand of the voters of the party." But in the same statement in which Mr. Roosevelt lays down his strict conditions of acceptance he makes the slip of the tongue, "I am in the fight," &c. (The paragraph is too long to quote.) But surely one cannot "be in a fight" if one does not seek a nomination, and is determined to fight for it. A fight means being an active candidate. Apparently we have either paradox or insincerity. Psychologically this can be easily explained without resort to conscious insincerity. It is a slip of the tongue. The impulse from a strong subconscious wish (inadmissible to himself) to get the nomination at an hazard slips in the expression in an inappropriate place. The new psychology thus explains how a person misstates his own conscious ideas (versprechen) as well as misreads his own statements. Psychology, however, does not deny that the subconscious is not one's true self.

Some time, then, after December the subconscious wish to fight for the nomination and supplant Mr. Taft had become acceptable to his consciousness and was avowed to himself. The reasons why he could now tolerate it are clear. He had been made by his friends to believe that the American people saw in his candidacy nothing pusillanimous, nothing disloyal and treacherous to Mr. Taft, nothing dishonorable in breaking a solemn promise, nothing unpatriotic in a third term. If the American people saw him in that light, then at least he could at last admit to himself the rightness of his wish, repression could cease, it could come into the full light of consciousness, and he could give full freedom to its carrying itself to fulfillment.

There are a number of other incidents in Mr. Roosevelt's recent career which would be psychologically interesting to analyze, but space forbids. One of them stands out prominently, namely, his opposition to the peace treaties published at the psychological moment of the calling of the Peace Convention in New York. This public announcement could be easily explained on the same principles which have been set forth above.

There is one point that ought to be touched upon, in justice to Mr. Roosevelt, as in this he has not done himself justice. In his letter to Mr. Munsey he states that at the very moment when he gave out his famous promise to the American people he contemplated the possibility of becoming again a candidate in 1912 or 1916. In other words, he was guilty of duplicity, of deceiving the people. He admits that he was aware that this statement would be interpreted as meaning that he never again would be a candidate, and yet he gave it out with the mental reservation that he might possibly be a candidate at a future date. He does not believe that Mr. Roosevelt has done justice to himself in so stating at this late time his previous thoughts in 1908. It is merely another instance of misreading into a previous state of mind his present state of mind. Undoubtedly, to



1904, as he states, the pros and cons of the arguments of a third term passed through his mind and were considered, but we must believe that he entirely rejected the arguments for a third term and that his final conclusion, which he gave out—that under no circumstances would he be a candidate or accept another nomination—represented his honest intention. Recalling now, however, all the memories of the arguments pro and con, he misreads into his previous mental attitude

his present intentions.

Psychology is more charitable than history and we can from its point of view acquit Mr. Roosevelt of intended duplicity at that time.

In conclusion, let me say that I think it safe to state that Mr. Roosevelt will go down into history as one of the most illustrious psychological examples of the distortion of conscious mental processes through the force of subconscious wishes.

Worsten Trince











































































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